Introduction
Spaceflight is a risky business. Although every reasonable effort is made to ensure the safety of space vehicles and their crews, there is always some residual risk of a mishap, so contingency plans and c~pabilities are established to assist in the recovery from a space operations mishap. Senior managers at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters will be heavily involved in the response to serioiis inishaps involving the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) or the International Space Station (ISS), as they were for Space Shuttles C h a l l e~~g e~ in I 986 and C<~lumbia in 2003.
Following the Space Shuttle Cl7allenger and Columbia accidents, the Roger's Cominission and the Columbia Accident l~~vestigation Board, respectively, werc chartered to determine the lechnical and organizational deficiencies responsible for these disasters. The media closely followed their day to day activities, mceting the public's demand for information and answers. Public interest fostered an environment whcrc accident investigations were conducted openly, thoroughly and with a keen sense of urgency.
Numerous books and papers have been written about the dynamics and processes used in these investigatio~is and the dcliberations leading to the development of specific recommendations. It is not the intent of this paper to repeat those events. Rather. the focus of this paper will be to briefly describe the ibllowing three topics: first, to describe how NASA labored to find a process to respond to high-visibility accidents in the post-Challenger era; second. to outline the process NASA used to track a i d dacument implementation of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board reco~nn~endations; and finally, to describe how NASA Headquarters managers used the lessons of Challenger and Columhiu to become an organization intent on maintaining a heightened awareness of every aspect of today's complex and inherently risky Space Shuttle and ISS niission activities.
Section 11 provides an overview of the NASA Headquarters mishap response process, and describes how it evolved fioin the beginning of the Space Shuttle program based on the Chullengrr accident. Section I11 identifies key Icssons learned while implementing the contingency response process fbllowing the C(>Iu,nbiu accident. And lastly, Section IV describes the Headquarters Space Operations Center (SOC) and its role in providing situational awareness to support senior nianagemcnt bcfore, during. and after a mishap. This paper only addresses the NASA mishap response and contingency declaration process as it relates to space operations missions under the purview of the NASA Spacc Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), specifically the SSP, the ISS Progran (ISSP). and the Launch Services Progrdin (unmanncd launches with NASA payloads). The paper does not address contingency plans and processes that inay exist for other NASA space prograins.
Headquarters 8'Iishap Response Process
The NASA Headquarters Spacc Shuttle Headquarters Ofiice has been the long-standing responsible office for maintaining a contingency response plan or Contingency Action Plan (CAP). In the early post-Apollo era, prior to the first Space Shuttle flight (STS-I on 198l) , the CAP addressed specific roles and responsibilities for Headquarters offices and NASA Ficld Centers involved in SSP proccssing and flight activities. Even the early CAP's outlined a process for identifying and responding to SSP-related mishaps. The appointment of a Mishap Investigation Board was the responsibility of the Associate Administrator for Spacc Transportation Systems (ANSTS) in consultation with the Administrator and the KASA Chief Safety Officer's concurrence. The inishap boards were supported by a number of working groups, identificd in the CAP, and in general located at the Field Centers. The Working Group chairs were appointed at the time of the mishap, fro111 NASA Field Ccnter personnel resources. The eleven initial Working Procedures Review 10) Public Affairs 1 I) Secretariat It is interesting to note that in the CAP'S published prior to the first Space Shuttle flight, the CAP's "effectivity" was defined to support just the Space Shuttle's Orbital Flight Test Program. ("EFFECTIVITY. This plan is effective immediately and will remain in effect through completion of the Orbital Flight Test Prograin.")! The rcference to the Orbital Flight Test Program may havc been a rcference to the first four "lcst" flights of the Space Shuttle. after which time it was envisioned that the Space Shuttle vehicle would become a fully "operational" system. However, a CAP document not only continued well beyond the Space Shuttle's Orbital Flight Test Program, hut kept intact the early definitions; the roles and responsibilities, and the use of Working Groups to support mishaps. Only slight changes to the Working Group structure, but not their functionality, occurred over the years leading to the ChuNenger accident.
A. How the Process was influenced by the Challenger Accident When the ChaNenger accident occuned, NASA convened a Mishap Investigation Board, following the guidelincs of thc CAP. When NASA learned that a Presidential Con~mission was being forlncd to investigate the accident, NASA opted to put the mishap board's activities on hold until the Presidential Commission was formed. When the Presidential Commission, or Rogers Commission, began their investigation, NASA disbanded its Mishap Investigation Board.
Post-ChaNenger, thc process of how XASA responded to mishaps changed. NASA caiiic away from the accident with a renewed motivation of not only maintaining an up-to-date CAP but to also be very proactive in its execution. The two most i~nportanl changes to thc CAP supporting this philosophical changc were the formation of ( I ) a Headquarters Contingexlcy Action Tcam and a (2) Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board.
When the Associate Administrator for Spacc Operations declares a mishap a contingency, the Adn~inistrator can authorize the activation of the Headquarters Contingency Action Team (HCAT) to help focus Headquaiters capabilities on an accident invcstigation. This ensures that needed personnel and financial resources are quickly and emciently applied to the investigation, and the relaying of accident investigation information to XASA's stakcholders is done with a high level of accmacy and consistency. The HCAT membership is pre-identified in the CAP as a group ofsenior NASA Headquarters managers and includes, as a minimum': 1 The goal was to quickly determine if the mishap was a contingency and if so, to assembly the HCAT and brief them on the available mishap details. This first briefing was referred to as the Mishap Response Teleconference, or MRT. Follox,ing the MRT, the JICAT wonid work on a forward plan for managing the contingency and prepare the first oficial external notifications to NASA's stake-holders, including the public.
The second major change was the adoption of a Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board. The concept for a standing board was proposed in the early 1990s. The idea was "bottom's up" proposed by the two NASA Headquaiters staff members responsible for niaintaining the "Agencji Contingenc," Aclion Plan (CAP) fiir S{>ace Oprration.s"'.
The concept was based on lessons learned from the Challenger accident investigation. After a thorough internal review, the concept was presented to the White House and approved in late Spring of 1995. The Board was to be comprised of the individuals filling the following federal government positions: 1) U S . Navy Commander, Naval Safety Center 2) U. The June 1995 letter to the initial interagency inembers filling the above positiolis asked for their suppoit and explained the rationale and their duties as follows:
"NASA believes that planning for a pre-established accident Lnvcsligation Board %,ill ailow an investigation of an incident involving serious injury. loss of life, or significant public interest to begin within 72 houri or the mishap. It would also eliminate pciceplion issues that accompany a pizrely intern& KASA investigation. This plan has been approved by thc Executive Ofiice ol'the ~residcnt."' The Board would use NASA's established support structure of working groups, facilities, and procedures, specified in the contingency action pians, ta conduct the investigation, All elements of NASA would respond directly to this Board, providing records, data. and any other administrative or technical support as required by the Board.
The responses to NASA's request for a Standing Interagency Mishap Invcstigation Board were unanimoilsly ones of endorsement of NASA's initiative to establish such a Board and full support for sewing on a Board if the need should ever arise.
B. Today's Contingency Action Plan
Today's CAP, the Agency Contingency Action Planjhr Space Operations, is virlually unchanged from the CAP in place prior to the Colirmhia accident. The key ciements of the CAP are the scope and definition of a Space Operations mishap, the definition of mishap types and the Headquarters roles and rcspo~isibiiities for mishap management. Mishaps are classified by Type (A, B, C; D. or Close Call), with a Type A mishap being the most severe. The deiinitions have remained unchanged for many years. Periodically there have been hints that the safety community would like to increase the dollar amounts associated with each Mishap Type in order to maintain a system of multiple categories. Due more to inflation than mishap severity, the trend has been for an increase in Type A mishaps. Listed below is a simplified version of the current mishap definitions: 1) m: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage is S1,000.000 or morc and injuries or illness result in fatalities or pemlanent total disabilities.
2) M: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at least $250,000 hut less than $1,000,000 and injuries or illness result in permanent partial disabilities.
3) m: Total direct cost of mission failure and property damage of at lcast $25,000 hut less than $250,000
and nonfatal injuries or illness resulting in lost workdays.
4) m:
Total direct cost of mission failure and property danlage of at lcast Sl.OOO hut less than $25,000
and any recordable injury or illness. 5) Close Call: An event in which there is no damage or damage less than Sl000 and no injuries or minor injuries only, hut which possesses a potential to cause a mishap.
Roles and~es~onsihilitie.~~
Each Headquarters organization plays a unique role in supporting a mishap investigation. While each organization has its assigncd responsibilities, it should come as no surprise that the synergy of working as a team is the most effective response for a major mishap. The organizations and their responsibilities are summarized below:
1) The Administrator can activate the HCAT to oversee an accident investigation, and may appoint a Senior Agency Official -Washington (SAO-W) to be a liaison with the Administration.
2) The Suace Ouerations Mission Directorate makes the decision to identify a mishap as a contingency, provides initial information to the HCAT members, and recommends Board selection.
3) The Office of Public Affairs manages and coordinates news inquiries. 4) Safetv and Mission Assurance provides advice to ihc Administrator and approval and concurrence as the Board is formed. 5) External Relations assists with ISS Partner notifications and reviews of international agreements.
6) The Office of Le~is-and Interrovernmental Affairs assists with notifications to members of Congress and the Administration. The KASA Field Centers and Programs also have their own mishap response plans that define their mishap and contingency procedures In a summary fashion; the relationship between Headquarters and Center responsibilities is shown in Fig. I . Throughout the various CAP revisions, the role of the Field Centers has remained one of procedures development to ensure timely mishap notification, investigation technical support, and recordkecping. When a mishap occurs, the responsible Center will he involved with impounding data and thc formation of technical Working Groups for mishap investigation support. Headquarters is responsible for defining policies, roles and responsibilities, and reporting requirementsiprocedt~res. Headquarters also works with the Centers to conduct periodic CAP program simulations for management training. The focus of these simulations is to address management's response to a mishap, management decisions that needed to be made as a result of the mishap. the role of other governinent agencies in supporting the mishap, and external notifications.
,%fi.slisl?ap Response Tirneline
When a mishap xcurs, the CAP clearly specifies a timeline for activities and decisions leading to the selection of a Mishap li~vestigation Board (ME). The organization involved is required to report the mishap to the Associate Adaninistiator for Space Opcrations within 60 minutes of occurrence, (To facilitate this notification the CAP has a "Sensitive hut Unclassified section, with restricted distribution, that contains telephone numbers for top Goveminent officials, International Partners, and NASA senior management.) From the initial notification to the selection of an MIR is no greater than a 48 hour process. All the key decisions are made within that time At NASA Headquarters. the capability to monitor mission activity was limited to local TV news and a handful of mission audio loops. A single employee was monitoring Columhia's reentry that Saturday morning from a small Headquarters conference room. The Associate Administrator for Space Operations, the NASA Chief Safety Officer, and the NASA Administrator were among the first called, shortly after 9:00 AM, when the media began showing video of the Columbia reentry. The decisions to declare a contingency and stand up the HCAT were made immediately.
By 11 :00 AM. the HCAT was in place, supported by many other Headquarters employees who came in to help in whatever way they could. Headquarters stood up a 2417 Return to Flight (RTF) Action Center until the CAIB released its final report in August 2003: The task of the Action Center was to maintain awareness of every aspect of the investigation, to organize the efforts of the HCAT, and to ensure the technical accuracy of every press release. To ensure consistency and accuracy, the Headquarters Public Affairs Office issued all NASA press releases related to the Columbia accident.
As the CAIB was rciessing its reconunendations, NASA formed an independent RTF Task Group to monitor implementation of each CAlB recommendation. Headquarters not only implemented the CAIB recommendations, but also provided the public with a regularly updated account of how the implementation and return to flight were proceeding. The document used for this purpose was the "NASA Imple~~%enfufio~? I'lanfor Space Shuffle Return to Flight and ~e~orid'." This document snnrmarized NASA's implementation of the CAIB recommendations as well as additional, intemally-generated activities designed to ensure a safe return to flight. It was published and roiitinely
B. Lessons Learned
I. The CAP Process Work.s When the Columbia accident occurred, was NASA better prepared to handle a major accident than it had been prior to Challenger? To a very great extent, it was. The CAP played out exactly as written. All CAP requirements were followed and resulted in meeting the CAP'S goal-oriented timeline (Fig. 2) . The verbal and written establishnlent of an MIB -the Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board, was accomplished in less than a day. From a procedural standpoint it could not have happened any more efficiently.
HCAT management of the accident from February I , 2003. through the delivery of the CATB report, met all expectations. The HCAT stayed engaged in the details of the accident investigation and respondcd promptly to requests for resources to keep the investigation moving.
The Colun~biiz accident scenario was different than anything imagined in prior mishap simulations. Prior to Columhia, mishap simulations were predominately launch relatcd and assumed a relatively small debris field. For Columbia, the debris field extended from sparsely populated areas southeast of Dallas, Texas, to western Louisiana. With the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Forest Service, a walk-down was organized to search for Orbiter debris (Fig. 3) . Eventually, the walk-down included I69 Tcxas counties and 52 pdrishcs in Louisiana. The search area amounted to 620,999 acres. Included in this area was the 14.48 square mile Toledo Bend Resen~oir.
The CAP worked well in getting the mishap investigation started. Once implenlented, process changes were made to accommodate the unique circumstances of the Columbia accident. Following Colurrihia it was thought best to leave any further CAP modifications to be addressed as a function of thc inishap details. However, the one strong message from Columbia remained the need for constant vigilance. Headquarters was transitioning from a strategic oversight role to an operational tactical role. The capabilities and operation of the SOC are discussed in derail in Section 1V of this paper.
The Need

Independence ofthe Standing Inre~agencj' Miyhi~p investigation Board
Another lesson had to do with the perceived independence of the Standing Interagency Mishap Investigation Board. During and post-Columbia, therc were debates about whether or not the CAIB was a truly "independent" hoard. At issue early on was the use of NASA's Chief of Safety and the KASA Chief Enginccr as an Ex-Officio Board member and Executive Secretaty, respectively. The intent of the CAP in assigning these roles was to assist the Board meinbcrs with using NASA proccdures to conduct the investigation. Shortly after the CAIB convened, the Chief of Safety removed himself as an Ex-Officio Board member due to a perceived conflict of interest. Later, the Board was allowed to develop and use its own investigation process to further help alleviate concern that the Board was not independent. The CAIB continued to follow the CAP process that showed it would report to the NASA Administrator. The CAP system of Support Staff (referred to as a Task Group in the CAP) and Advisors to the CAIB uras used with minor modifications.
The Interagency Board organizational structure outlined in the CAP is shown in Fig. 4 . Although most believed that the Board did a very good job of maintaining its independence, some still doubted that it could be independent given its reporting responsibility to the NASA Administrator and the large number of NASA staff that supported the Board's investigation. To "correct" this perceived flaw. a new requirement was placed in Public Law 109-155. the NASA Authorization Act of 2005~. Title VIII, Subtitle B of this Law established a requirement for a Presidential Commission, called the "Human Space Flight Independent Investigation Commission", to be formed ifSASA has a high-visibility mishap involving loss of crew or vehicle.
The operating guidelines for the Commission would be as follows: The Commission will be established within 7 days of a mishap that results in loss of a Space Shuttle, the ISS or its operational viability, any olhcr governmentowned U.S. space vehicle carrying humans, or a crew member or passenger of any space vehicle described above. It will investigate and determine cause; identifji all contributing factors; make recommendations; and prepare a report to Congress, the President, and the public (including minority opinions and interim reports as necessary). It has the power to hold hearings and subpoena evidence, enter into contracts, and obtain assistance from other Federal Agencies as necessary. NASA employees are not allowed to serve on the Commission, except that the NASA Engineering and Safety Center will provide data and technical ruppott as requested by the Commission.
At the time of a mishap, NASA senior management would decide whether or not NASA should conduct its own investigation, as outlined in the CAP, in parallel with the Commission investigation.
IV. T h e N A S A Headquarters Space Operations Center (SOC)
The NASA Headquarters SOMD has established the SOC as a focal point to support senior management before, during, and after a contingency involving SOMD missions. The SOC facility, as shown in Fig. 5 . is located on the 7Ih floor of the NASA Headquarters building in Washington, DC. The SOC, which was created after the Columbia accident, has supported all Space Shuttle missions since Return to Flight in 2005, as well as ongoing operations of the ISS. This section describes the capabilities of the SOC and its role in providing situational awareness for a spaceflight contingency response. The SOC provides a secure environment for receiving and displaying sufficiently detailed mission data to enable Headquarters staff to monitor and assess mission operations in real-time. SOC resources are used to provide senior Agency management with reliable and timely status and assessments of Space Shuttle and ISS mission operations. Capabilities needed to nerform these functions include realtime access to mission video, data, and voice loops; video and voice conferencing capabilities; robust multimedia display capabilities; dedicated laptops and printers; secure data storage; telephones and network drops: and multiple missionjtime zone clocks to support the international launch and mission operations that are monitored from the SOC. Because the SOC is used strictly for mission monitoring and has no actual command and control functions, there is no conunanding capability. A summary of SOC capabilities is shown in Table 1 The SOC was designed to function as both a full featured conference room and a mission support facility. This enables Headquarters personnel to participate in routine mission meetings, such as the daily SSP and ISS Mission Management Team (MMT) meetings, where key mission decisions are madc, while simultaneously monitoring mission onerations. (The SOC can and has been used to allow NASA senior managers video and telephone access to crcws on orbit.) In the case of a declared spaceflight contingency, the SOC provides a secure location for senior managers to convene for mishap response meetings and to collecWdisseminate information.
Two additional nearby conference rooms with limited SOC capahilities are also available as overflow or backup facilities when needed.
B. Role of the SOC in Providing Routine Situational Awareness
As was discussed in Section I11 of this paper. one of the key lessons learned from the Colunlhia accident was the need to increase the levcl of situational awareness prior to and during a mishap to enable a more effective and timely response. Since Columbia, the SOMD has enhanced its monitoring of critical human spaceflight events, using the SOC capabilities described above, in order to provide senior managers with routine mission status reports and contingency alerts. The SOC staff, comprised of senior SOMD personnel supporting the SSP and ISSP, performs these monitoringlreporting functions and provides the linkage between flight management teams and Headquarters senior management. The SOC staff distills pertinent technical information from a variety of detailed mission data sources (e.g., mission video, voice loops, information systems, meetings) and summarizes key points at a level appropriate to recipients of thc SOC status mports.
Who is the audience for the SOC reports? In general. the audience is senior Agency leadership, other U.S. federal agencies, and NASA Hcadqua~terslCenter personnel who need to be informed of or involved in a Space Shuttle or ISS contingency response. .4s defined in Section I1 of this paper, this includes the HCAT, XASA Headquarters and Center senior management, mishap investigation board members, 1SS and SSP managers, key personnel in the U.S. Govcmrnent executive branch, and Headquarters personnel representing functional areas such as safety and mission assurance, engineering, public affairs, external relations, general counsel. institutional management, and legislative affairs, that would support the mishap response.
I. Moniroring of1SS Operations
The SOC is not staffed on a continual basis, even though the ISS Program has ongoing crewed operations 2417, SOC monitoring and reporting of ISS operations is reserved for certain critical mission activities, which are considered to be either inherently more risky or of rnuch greater interest than routine daily operations. Events that are monitored include all spacewalks (also known as Extravehicular Activity (EVA)), arrivals1departures of visiting vehicles to the ISS, launchesllandings of ISS crewmembers aboard Russian Soyuz spacecraft, and relocations of a Soyuz spacecraft at the ISS. ISS international partner vehicles that have visited the ISS include thc Russian crewed Soyuz, and uncrewed Russian Progress, European Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and Japanese H-Il Transfer Vehicle (HTV) vehicles. Commercial cargo vehicles are expected to arrive in the next few years, follo\ved by future crewed exploration vehicles. All of these events are monitored; other evcnts may bc monitored on a case-by-case basis.
Event status reports are typically just brief text inessages describing progress or completion of a mission event, sent via e-mail to a pre-defined distribution list. Here is an exainplc of a message used for the arrival of a visiting vehicle, in this case the Japanese HTV: Here is an example of a typical status message marking the start of an ISS EVA:
ISS Commander Gcnnady Padalka and Flight Engineer Mike Barrall haw begun tonight's spacewalk, x,ith hatch opening at 2:55 AM EDT. The EVA is scheduled lo last less than I hour. Tonioht's "internal" EVA will take place within the depressurized transfcr compartment betx,een the Service Module and the Functional Cargo Block (FGB) module. The crew will relocate a docking cone to the zenith docking asscmbiy where the Mini-Research Module 2 (MRM?) will be docked in November. The MRM2 will provide an additional docking port for Russian vehicles.
2.
Monitoring uJSpace Shuttie opera fir in.^ Monitoring and reporting for Space Shuttle missions is more extensive than for standalone ISS events. In addition to realtime status reports for critical events, there are SOC Daily Reports (described below) that can bc used for more detailed discussion of mission issues.
The SOC is staffed from several days before a Shu~ttle launch until after landing. SOC reporting hcgins with the results of the Launch minus 2 Day (L-2) and L-1 Mission Management Team (MMT) meetings, so that senior managers are aware of any issues that are being worked prior to launch. The SOC team also monitors the pre-launch sequence, beginning with tanking, and provides periodic stanis messages tracking the progress of the Launch coumtdom, including updates to thc launch weather forecast.
For each on-orbit flight day between launch and landing, the SOC team monitors mission operations and key mission meetings. A SOC Daily Report is produced which surnmanzes the day's major accomplishments, status of Shuttle and ISS systems, significant issues that may impact the mission, key decisions that have been made by the Shuttle and ISS MMTs, and a sumniary of upcoming events by flight day. The SOC Daily Report includes the current assessment of the Shuttle's Thermal Protection System (TPS), as downlinked imagery of the TPS is evaluated until the TPS is cleared for landing. An example of the SOC Daily Repon is provided in Fig. 6 . Space Shuttlc Landing day, like launch day, is monitored very closely with numerous status updates from deorbit prep through "Wheels Stop" at the two CONUS Shuttle landing sites: KSC in Florida or Edwards Air Force Rase in California. Besides launch and landing, realtiiule event status inessages are also sent for docking, undocking, EVAs, significant robotic operations. and other key events.
.%fission Briefing Packages
Also. prior to each Space Shuttle flight and Soyuz mission to the ISS; a briefing package is distributed to the standard SOC distribution list which describes basic infonrlation about the rrrission and the Headquarters contingency action plan. This background information, aioilg with the realtiine unission status updates, helps to promote the situational awareness that is necded to effectively respond to a contingency situation. Management knows when critical spaceflight events are about to happen, when they are completed, and is infonned of issues as they arise, so that if significant problems do occur. they are in a much better position to react. Senior managers and others within the NASA Headquarters building also know that they can come to thc SOC to watch a mission event firsthand, to get a quick status, or to request additional infonnation about a specific issue. 
ISS Status
There are currently no ISS systems that wouid impact docked operations. With today's exchange of Soyuz seatliners, Endeavour Mission Specialist Tim Kopra and Space Station Flight Engineer Koichi Wakata swap crew affiliations. Wakata has spent 124 days in space, 122 days as a space station Expedition crew member.
C. Rote of the SOC During and After a Mishap
In the event of a mishap affecting the Space Shuttle or ISS, those on duty in the SOC at the time of the mishap will assist as needed in initiating the appropriate response per the process defined in Section I1 of this paper. This may include notifying management, the HCAT, and others of the mishap. After a contingency is formally declared, the SOC facility will transition to the HCAT which will use it as the HCAT Action Center, as was done after the Columbia accident. As was noted earlier, the SOC provides a secure environment with videoconferencing capabilities that can be used for mishap response meetings and data collection.
In case of a mishap involving an ISS visiting vehicle (e.g., Progress. S o p z , ATV, HTV), the vehicle owner (e.g., space agency of Russia, Europe, or Japan; commcrcial launch vehicle provider) is responsible for the mishap response and mishap investigation related to the vehicle. However, if the ISS or the ISS crew is impacted by the mishap, then the NASA SOMD contingency action plan may also be invoked.
V. Conclusions
Historically, NASA's SOMD CAP has provided the Agency with the policy, roles and responsibilities, and procedures documentation to effectively respond to mishaps. Lessons learned from the Challenger accident left NASA better prepared to handle a high visibility mishap and implement the CAP for the Col~rmhia accident. The Agency response to the Coirrrnhia accident demonstrated the flexibility of the CAP and yielded new lessons for responding to future mishaps. This could lead one to believe that nothing is left to do to prepare for another possible mishap. The reality may be that there is nothing M h e r fiom the truth.
As NASA continues to operate in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and begins planning to move human exploration beyond LEO, the complexity of handling a mishap will no doubt significantly increase. A lack of recoverable hardware and delaying the start of a mishap investigation pending safe return of crew have the potential to complicate the determination of cause and sound implementing solutions. Also, NASA's increasing reliance on International Partners and curnmercial providers for crew and cargo transportation to the ISS could further complicate a mishap response because of the additional players involved in the process. Depending on the nature of the mishap and the vehicle(s) involved, there is a potential for multiple investigation boards to be operating simultaneously.
Finally, situational awareness of mission events, before, during, and after a mishap, is critical. Along with effective contingency planning. tools that assist decision makers in maintaining situational awareness are the best means to prepare for, and possibly even prevent, future mishaps, The NASA Headquarters Space Operations Center is one such tool.
